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RECONCILING U.S. BANKING AND SECURITIES
DATA PRESERVATION RULES WITH EUROPEAN
MANDATORY DATA ERASURE UNDER GDPR
Ronald V. Distante*
ABSTRACT
United States law, which requires financial institutions to retain
customer data, conflicts with European Union law, which requires
financial institutions to delete customer data on demand. A financial
institution operating transnationally cannot comply with both U.S. and
EU law. Financial institutions thus face the issue that they cannot
possibly delete and retain the same data simultaneously. This Note
will clarify the scope and nature of this conflict.
First, it will clarify the conflict by examining (1) the relevant laws,
which are Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the
U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulations, (2) GDPR’s application to U.S. financial
institutions, and (3) U.S. law’s extraterritorial application to financial
institutions operating in Europe, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Morrison-Kiobel two-step analysis. Second, it will propose a solution
by examining international law and U.S. foreign relations law.
United States law subjects financial institutions to multiple dataretention requirements. Securities regulations require broker-dealers
to retain customer account and complaint records. The Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970 requires financial institutions to retain customer data for
at least five years. Sometimes, banks must permanently retain certain
records.
GDPR empowers individuals to demand that companies erase their
data. Couched in the theory of a right to erasure, GDPR lets customers
*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2019; B.A., Economics and
Political Science, Iona College, 2015. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their hard work and valuable
contributions to this Note. I would especially like to thank Professor Marc Arkin, without
whom this Note would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank my family
and friends for their steadfast support during law school, especially during the months I
spent on this Note.

195

196

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXV

withdraw their consent for a financial institution to process or retain
their data. Violators may face fines of 4 percent of their worldwide
revenue. GDPR applies broadly to U.S. data-processors that either (1)
are established in the European Union, or (2) monitor or offer to sell
goods or services to individuals in the European Union. Establishment
is broadly construed by European courts and may be met by “a single
representative in the European Union.”
In U.S. law, a two-step analysis determines whether and to what extent
federal statutes govern conduct abroad. First, courts analyze whether
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted. The
presumption derives from the canon that a statute, “unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction” of the United States. If the presumption is not rebutted,
the court proceeds to the second step, when the court considers the
statute’s “focus” and whether the case involves the statute’s domestic
application. United States law has domestic application to data stored
domestically, and sometimes possibly to data stored internationally;
such data operations may also fall under GPDR’s jurisdiction. Then,
if a customer asks a financial institution to delete data, the financial
institution will face conflicting laws.
This Note seeks to resolve the conflict, recommending that courts
approach resolution from the framework of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law.
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INTRODUCTION
United States financial law conflicts with European Union data
protection law. United States financial law, meaning banking law and
securities law, requires financial institutions to keep and maintain
customer data for specified time periods.1 Specifically, securities law
requires certain classes of data to be kept and maintained on nonrewritable, non-erasable storage media.2 European Union data protection
law requires firms doing business with European customers to honor
customer requests for data erasure.3
A U.S. financial institution doing business with customers from the
European Union cannot possibly comply with both sets of laws as it
cannot preserve and erase the same data simultaneously. Therefore, if a
U.S.-regulated financial institution does business with a European
customer who later demands erasure, the institution faces conflicting
requirements. This issue is especially prominent in light of the financial
system’s international nature. Investors from EU Member States traded
over $16.52 trillion U.S. securities in the first half of 2018, and at the end
of 2017, 5.15 percent of FINRA member-firms had foreign offices.4
Part I of this Note focuses first on U.S. federal law. It discusses
financial law and foreign relations law. Financial law consists of banking
law and securities law. Each require U.S. financial institutions to keep and
maintain customer data for minimum time periods. Securities law requires
broker-dealers to keep and maintain much of this data in a format that
cannot be altered or erased during the retention period.5
United States foreign relations law consists of two parts “(a)
international law as it applies to the United States; and (b) domestic law
that has [either] substantial significance for . . . foreign relations . . . or . .
. substantial international consequences.”6 The domestic component
1.
2.
3.
4.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(a-b) (2019).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(f)(2)(ii)(A) (2019).
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU).
The statistics were calculated based on the data in these two reports: 2018
FINRA
Industry
Snapshot
(2018),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/2018_finra_industry_snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY86-ZYGR]; Securities
Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Foreign Activity Report: Second Quarter 2018 (Aug. 2018),
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/US-Foreign-Activity-Report-201808-17-SIFMA.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E5Q-BY55].
5. See generally, Part I.A.2, infra.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
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mainly consists of the Constitution, statutes, court decisions, federal rules,
and federal regulatory actions.7 The domestic component includes
conflict of law rules, i.e., “law directed to resolving controversies between
private persons . . . arising out of situations having a significant
relationship to more than one state.”8
Part I also focuses on two subjects in EU law. First, it discusses the
data protection law: the General Data Protection Regulation. In particular,
pursuant to Article 17(1), the General Data Protection Regulation
compels firms who do business with European customers to erase
personal data about any customers who demand erasure.9 Second, Part I
discusses European financial regulation under the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive. Specifically, it focuses on that law’s limited data
retention requirements for European investment firms. Such requirements
are relevant to the interest balancing test discussed in Parts II and III.
Part II focuses on frameworks for resolving this conflict, both when
litigated in U.S. courts and when litigated in European courts. United
States foreign relations law and customary international law both suggest
an interest balancing approach to resolving conflicts of law.10
Understanding interest balancing requires understanding the concepts of
jurisdiction to prescribe and international comity.11
United States foreign relations law does not bind the European
Union.12 Litigating data-related conflicts in European courts would likely
result in a judgment against the U.S. financial institution when, as
discussed in Part II, European conflict of law rules apply European data

7.
8.

Id. § 1 cmt. b.
Id. § 101 cmt. c. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1969)) (noting that most countries call this topic “private international law”
and including private international law in domestic foreign relations law because “many
matters of private international law have substantial international significance and
therefore may be considered foreign relations law” under section 1).
9. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU).
10. See generally infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.,
Introduction (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“As the Reporters of the previous Restatement said
(p. xii): ‘[t]he positions or outlooks of particular states, including the United States,
should not be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support.’ Like
the previous Restatement, this Restatement represents the opinion of The American Law
Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a
controversy in accordance with international law.”).
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protection law instead of U.S. financial law.13 Part II also discusses the
European Union’s jurisdiction to enforce judgments against nonEuropean businesses in the United States.
Part III first balances each states’ interest in applying its substantive
law. Then, it performs balancing tests for banking law and securities law.
In so balancing, it offers a resolution to the conflict when litigated in U.S.
courts. Since European conflict of law rules govern the conflict in
European courts, Part III examines the enforceability of European
judgments against U.S. financial institutions in U.S. courts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL LAW
At the federal level, U.S. financial law includes securities law and
banking law. Banking law is a patchwork of statutes and regulations, such
as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Foreign Asset Control Regulations.14
Securities law is an even more complex patchwork of statutes,
regulations, and self-regulatory rules.15 This section will first explain
relevant banking law and then explain relevant securities law.
1. United States Banking Law
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 is one of the most important federal
banking statutes. Treasury regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act
require financial institutions to “retain records required by the Bank
Secrecy Act for a period of five years.”16 These records include, inter alia:

13.
14.

See discussion infra Part II.
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 500 (2019); OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) & Related Regulations,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/bsa/bsa-regulations/index-bsaregulations.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/DU2B-SHKY]; Elizabeth
Fast, Document Retention Policy for Banks, SPENCER FANE LLP (Jul. 15, 2016),
https://www.spencerfane.com/publication/document-retention-policy-forbanks/https://www.spencerfane.com/publication/document-retention-policy-for-banks/
[https://perma.cc/3HZ5-U9XL].
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
16. Stacey Garrett, Cybersecurity Law & Strategy, “Are U.S. Records Retention
Requirements on a Collision Course with the GDPR’s ‘Right to Erasure?’”, L. J.
NEWSLS. (May 2018) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1010.430(d) (2019)).
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A record of each extension of credit in an amount in excess of $10,000
. . . [containing] the name and address of the person to whom the
extension of credit is made . . .
A record of each . . . instruction received or given regarding any
transaction resulting (or intended to result . . .) in the transfer of
currency or other monetary instruments, funds, checks, investment
securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to or from any person,
account, or place outside the United States.
A record of each . . . instruction given to another financial institution
or other person located within or without the United States, regarding
a transaction intended to result in the transfer . . . of more than $10,000
to a person, account or place outside the United States.17

The Bank Secrecy Act also requires banks to maintain Customer
Identification Programs (CIPs).18 A CIP must provide for the collection
of identifying data about the bank’s customers, e.g., their name, date of
birth, and an identification number—such as a taxpayer identification
number or passport number.19 The bank must retain this data for at least
five years after the account closes.20 In addition to the Bank Secrecy Act,
various other federal statutes also impose mandatory minimum document
retention periods, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Truth in
Lending Act, Truth in Savings Act, and Electronic Funds Transfer Act.21

17.
18.

31 C.F.R. § 1010.410 (2019).
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL: CORE EXAMINATION OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURE
FOR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED TOPICS: CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION
PROGRAM—OVERVIEW 45, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/
olm_011.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9H3M-AUCL] (citing 12
C.F.R. §§ 21.21, 208.63(b), 211.5(m), 211,24(j), 748.2(b); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2019))
(“The CIP is intended to enable the bank to form a reasonable belief that it knows the
true identity of each customer. The CIP must include account opening procedures that
specify the identifying information and practical risk-based procedures for verifying the
identity of each customer.”).
19. Id. at 47 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (2012)).
20. Id. at 49 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 103.38 (2019)).
21. Fast, supra note 14.
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2. United States Securities Law
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
imposed a comprehensive federal regulatory system on the securities
industry:22 “The Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), a federal agency with the authority to regulate the
securities industry.”23 The SEC creates regulations under the Exchange
Act and other federal statutes—such as the Securities Act of 1933—and
also enforces federal securities law.24 However, “because the SEC lacks
the resources to police the entire industry, it relies on” (a) a self-regulatory
scheme created by Congress and (b) “industry members to promote
compliance with the securities laws and regulations to pursue
enforcement actions.”25 In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act,
which amended the Exchange Act to create “extensive guidelines for the
formation and oversight of self-regulatory organizations,” as well as to
better regulate “over-the-counter brokers and dealers operating in
interstate and foreign commerce . . . [and] to prevent acts and practices
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.”26
Essentially, the Maloney Act authorized the SEC to delegate
regulatory authority to a self-regulatory organization that registers as a
national securities association.27 Associations applying to register as
national securities associations must provide their rules to the SEC.28
Once registered, a national securities association needs SEC approval to
change its rules, and the SEC may “abrogate, add to, or delete from . . .
the rules . . . as the [SEC] deems necessary or appropriate to insure the
22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 48 Stat. 881 (1934);
Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 879–80 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Austin Mun. Sec.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 680 (5th Cir. 1985)).
23. Legal Information Institute, Securities Law History, available at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Mar. 16, 2019);
see also Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Gold v. SEC, 48
F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1995)).
24. Securities Law History, supra note 23; U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, WHAT
WE
DO
(June
10,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html
[https://perma.cc/4Z44-DEXE].
25. Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 474 (citing Gold, 48 F.3d at 990); 15 U.S.C. § 78s
(2012).
26. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938); Karsner,
532 F.3d 879–80 (quoting Austin, 757 F.2d at 680).
27. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938).
28. Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(a) (2012)).
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fair administration of the self-regulatory organization [or] to conform its
rules to [statutory requirements].”29 Sections 15 and 19 of the Exchange
Act create a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the SEC to delegate
authority to and exercise control over self-regulatory organizations that
register as national securities associations.30
Pursuant to this comprehensive regulatory scheme, the SEC
delegated authority to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
a self-regulatory organization (SRO) “as a national securities association
registered with the SEC pursuant to the Maloney Act . . . .”31 FINRA has
a monopoly on self-regulation of the securities industry because it is “the
only officially registered national securities association” and all securities
firms that “do business with the public” must be FINRA members and are
thus subject to FINRA’s comprehensive oversight authority.32 FINRA is
29. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(1), (c) (2012)); see also Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at
475 n.2 (citing Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 704 F.3d 475, 476 (7th Cir.
2013)).
30. Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 844 F.3d
414, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012)) (“Section 19 . . . lays out a
comprehensive oversight scheme whereby Congress gives the SEC the authority to
supervise FINRA’s rules.”); see also Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372,
374 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78s (2012); Fiero v. Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 571–72, 574 (2d Cir. 2011)).
31. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571 (citing Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat.
1070 (1938); Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1999)).
FINRA was created in 2007 as a consolidation of the National Association of Securities
Dealers—the securities industry’s primary self-regulatory organization at the time—and
the New York Stock Exchange’s “enforcement, arbitration, and member regulation arm.”
Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 71 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008).
32. Virtually every circuit has so held. See, e.g., Picet Overseas Inc. v. Helvetia Tr.,
905 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011)) (acknowledging FINRA’s comprehensive
oversight authority); Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citing McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013));
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing FINRA
Bylaws, art. IV, § 1(a)) (stating “FINRA has instituted rules with which its members . . .
agree to comply”); Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 475 n.2 (citing McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs.,
LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013)); Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571 (citing Sacks v. SEC,
648 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)) (stating that “[a]s a practical matter, all securities firms
dealing with the public must be members of FINRA.”); Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (quoting
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (stating that
“FINRA, as NASD’s successor, is ‘the only officially registered national securities
association.’”); Rodriguez v. Charles Schwab Corp., No. 12-cv-2277 JTF-TMP, 2013
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a “quasi-governmental agency with express statutory [regulatory]
authority.”33 Nearly all federal circuits have recognized FINRA’s
regulatory authority, and none have rejected it.34

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33217, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 2013) (citing P&M Corporate
Fin., LLC v. Paparella, No. 2:10-cv-10448, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112907, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 22, 2010)) (stating “FINRA has established a set of rules which its industry
members must follow.”).
Notably, while still recognizing FINRA’s regulatory authority, the Second Circuit held
FINRA lacks statutory authorization to judicially enforce penalties it assesses; however,
it also affirmed FINRA’s authority to enforce sanctions by, inter alia, barring members
from the securities industry, and seeking SEC enforcement in appropriate circumstances.
Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 970 n.42 (2012)
(citing Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572).
33. Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2012)). The Exchange
Act requires FINRA to “provide a fair [disciplinary] procedure,” authorizes it to “initiate
a disciplinary proceeding against any FINRA member or associated person for violating
any FINRA rule, SEC regulation, or statutory provision,” and authorizes the SEC to
“review a final disciplinary sanction imposed by FINRA.” Scottsdale, 844 F.3d at 424
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1) (2012)); Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78s(h)(3)). The statutory scheme and FINRA rules combine to form a robust adjudicative
and appellate process. First, FINRA issues and files a complaint; then, a panel hears the
matter and issues a decision; the panel decision is appealable to FINRA’s National
Adjudicatory Council (“NAC”); the NAC decision is appealable to the SEC; and the SEC
decision is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals. See Macey & Novogrod,
supra note 31, 970 n.42 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8)).
34. See e.g., Picet, 905 F.3d at 1187; Bear Stearns, 900 F.3d at 90 n.1; Wiley v. SEC,
663 Fed. Appx. 353, 356 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016); Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 474–75; Goldman,
747 F.3d at 749; Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571–72; UBS, 660 F.3d at 648; Karsner, 532 F.3d at
880; Mscisz, 531 F.3d at 71 n.1.
The Eight and Tenth Circuits have not ruled on FINRA’s authority. The only
relevant Sixth Circuit holding was an unreported decision recognizing FINRA’s
authority. See Troszak v. SEC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 24259, at *1 (6th Cir. June 29,
2016). Many district courts in these circuits have recognized FINRA’s authority and none
have rejected it. See e.g., Balabon v. Ketchum, No. 1:17-CV-486-LY, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22098, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018); Wilbanks Sec., Inc. v. Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth., Inc., No. CIV-17-481-R, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71242, at *1–2 (W.D.
Okla. May 10, 2017); Zola v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 172 F. Supp.3d 1055, 1065 n.8 (D.
Neb. Mar. 3, 2016); Klatte v. Buckman, Buckman & Reid, Inc., 995 F. Supp.2d 951, 953
n.1 (D. Minn. 2014); Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33217, No. 12-cv-2277 JTFTMP, at *2 n.3; Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Louise Silverman Tr., No. JFM-11-2533, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3870, at *1–2 n.1 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012); Morgan Keegan & Co. v.
Ras, No. 5:11-CV-352-KKC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150392, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
14, 2011); Gilmore v. Brandt, No. 11-cv-00151-REB-KMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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The Exchange Act requires FINRA to have rules that “provide for
the enforcement of federal securities laws and [SEC] rules.”35 FINRA
rules constitute federal securities laws as a result of its statutorily-created
regulatory monopoly.36 The rules also require members to “make and
preserve books and records as required under the FINRA rules, the
Exchange Act and the applicable Exchange Act rules.”37 The rules also
require members to maintain and preserve customer data, including new
account information, updates to new account information,
correspondence with customers, written records of customer complaints,
and documents related to the allocation of option exercise assignment
notices.38

125812, at *14 n.6 (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2011); Empire Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Penson Fin. Servs.,
No. 3:09-CV-2155-D, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18782, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2010).
35. Sharemaster v. SEC, 847 F.3d 1059, 1062 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6)–(8)
(2012)) (9th Cir. 2017).
36. See Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 475 n.2. FINRA’s de facto regulatory authority is a
product of the SEC approval process. Because FINRA is a private entity, SEC approval
is a necessary procedural safeguard against the private non-delegation doctrine, which
generally bars delegation of rulemaking authority to private entities. See generally Emily
Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (2016)
(explaining the private non-delegation doctrine and FINRA’s relationship to the SEC).
37. FINRA, RULE 4511(a): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finrarules/4511?element_id=9957&rbid=2403 [https://perma.cc/VEZ4-B396].
38. See FINRA, RULE 2360(b)(23)(C)(iii): OPTIONS, FINRA MANUAL (2019),
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2360 (requiring,
at Rule 2360(b)(23)(C)(iii), preservation of documents related to the allocation of option
exercise assignment notices); see also FINRA, RULE 2210(b)(2): COMMUNICATIONS WITH
THE PUBLIC, FINRA MANUAL (2019), available at https://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2210 (stating that Rule 2210(b)(2) subjects
correspondence, including correspondence with customers, to the supervision and review
requirements of Rules 3110(b) and 3110.06–09); see also FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(5):
SUPERVISION, FINRA MANUAL (2017), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=11345 (stating that Rule 3110(b)(5)
requires members’ Written Supervisory Procedures to “include procedures to capture . .
. all written . . . customer complaints.”); see also FINRA, RULE 4513(a): RECORDS OF
WRITTEN CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9959
(requiring four-year retention of written customer complaints); see also FINRA, RULE
4512(a): CUSTOMER ACCOUNT INFORMATION, FINRA MANUAL (2019), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9958
(requiring maintenance and preservation of customer account information).
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The SEC has authority under the Exchange Act to make rules
requiring broker-dealers to “make and keep for prescribed periods . . .
such records as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the
protection of investors” or to achieve the Act’s purposes.39 Using this
authority, the SEC issued Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4, directing which records
broker-dealers must make, how to make them, how to maintain them, and
how long to retain them.40 SEC Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 derive statutory
authority from Section 17a(1) of the Exchange Act.41
SEC Rule 17a-4(f) requires broker-dealers to preserve electronic
records “in a non-rewritable and non-erasable format.”42 This kind of
format is called WORM storage, meaning “write once, read many.”43 To
comply with Rule 17a-4, a broker-dealer’s storage system must do more
than merely “mitigate the risk a record will be overwritten or erased.”44
The system must make it impossible to “overwrite or erase records.”45 In
addition, SEC Rule 17a-8 “requires broker-dealers to comply with the
reporting, recordkeeping, and record retention rules” under the Bank
Secrecy Act.46
The SEC’s interpretive guidance on electronic storage of brokerdealer records explains these rules’ purpose:

39. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg.
25281
(May
12,
2003),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (2012)).
40. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, 240.17a-4 (2019)).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (2012).
42. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 25281 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7].
43. Jonathan Fiur, Deconstructing SEA FINRA 17a-4 (Worm Compliance), APRIMO:
THE APRIMO BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.aprimo.com/blog/deconstructing-seafinra-17a-4-worm-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/MP5P-J83U].
44. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 25282 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7].
45. Id. (stating that “[a] broker-dealer would not violate the requirement in paragraph
(f)(2)(ii)(A) of the rule if it used an electronic storage system that prevents the
overwriting, erasing or otherwise altering of a record during its required retention period
through the use of integrated hardware and software control codes.”).
46. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
(AML) SOURCE TOOL FOR BROKER-DEALERS (2018), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/
ocie/amlsourcetool.htm [https://perma.cc/XQU2-MHEQ] (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8
(2019)); see supra Part I.A.1 (explaining the Bank Secrecy Act).
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These requirements are integral to the [SEC] investor protection
function because the preserved records are the primary means of
monitoring compliance with applicable securities laws, including
antifraud provisions and financial responsibility standards. Recent
events involving the deletion of emails by broker-dealers have
affirmed the need to have measures in place to protect record
integrity.47

Congress has affirmed the importance of data preservation
requirements. Senators Hollings, Wyden, and Sarbanes stated that “bank
and other financial regulators need to require that records be retained in
order that their examiners can insure the safety and soundness of the
institutions and compliance with all relevant regulatory requirements.”48
Essentially, regulators must be able to expect broker-dealers “to furnish
promptly . . . legible, true and complete copies of those records” per
regulator request.49 This public policy favoring data preservation is
reflected in FINRA Rules 4511 and 8210.50
FINRA Rule 4511 requires member firms to preserve books and
records in a format compatible with SEC Rule 17a-4.51 FINRA Rule 8210
requires member firms to comply with FINRA’s requests to “provide
information . . . required to be [] maintained in electronic form” and to
47. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 25282 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7]; see also SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance to
Broker-Dealers on the Use of Electronic Storage Media, 66 Fed. Reg. 22916, 22919 (May
7, 2001) (stating that “Commission enforcement actions against unscrupulous brokerdealers that improperly altered or destroyed records demonstrate the need for measures
aimed at maintaining the integrity of broker-dealer records. These cases have included
situations in which broker-dealer employers have changed or destroyed order tickets and
other transactional records in an effort to shift firm losses to their customers or to conceal
fraudulent activities.”).
48. SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance to Broker-Dealers on the Use of
Electronic Storage Media, 66 Fed. Reg. 22916, 22921 (May 1, 2001) (citing 146 CONG.
REC. S5230 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hollings, Wyden, and
Sarbanes)).
49. Id. at 22919.
50. See FINRA, RULE 4511(c): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finrarules/4511?element_id=9957&rbid=2403; see also FINRA, RULE 8210(a): PROVISION OF
INFORMATION AND TESTIMONY AND INSPECTION AND COPYING OF BOOKS, FINRA
MANUAL (2013), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finrarules/8210.
51. FINRA, RULE 4511(c): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011).
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“provide information . . . [and] permit an inspection and copying of books,
records, or accounts pursuant to this Rule.”52
B. EUROPEAN UNION LAW
The European Union is comprised of twenty-eight Member States
and has many federal aspects to it.53 Two of its regulatory schemes are
relevant to this Note. First is the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which regulates processing of EU residents’ personal data.54
Second is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.55
1. General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR is a binding regulation.56 It replaced Directive 95/46/EC,
the Data Protection Directive.57 GDPR Article 5(1) requires data
processors, including financial institutions, to process personal data
“lawfully.”58 Processing is a technical term for data operations.59 It

52. FINRA RULE 8210(a), (c): PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND TESTIMONY AND
INSPECTION AND COPYING OF BOOKS, FINRA MANUAL (2013), available at
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/8210.
53. Amy Verdun, The Federal Features of the EU: Lessons from Canada, 4 Pol. &
Governance 100, 103–10 (2016).
54. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU).
55. Council Regulation 2014/65, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EC).
56. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); see, e.g.,
Types of EU Law, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-makingprocess/types-eu-law_en [https://perma.cc/T478-D95Z] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019);
Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, European Union, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/eu-law/legal-acts_en [https://perma.cc/TX7Z-P3UG] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019);
Applying EU Law, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-makingprocess/applying-eu-law_en [https://perma.cc/3TZJ-4MFY] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
Regulations are binding on their own; with directives, responsibility rests with Member
States to enact their own implementing laws.
57. Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the GDPR Article 22, 31 STANFORD-VIENNA
TRANSATLANTIC TECH. F. 1, 1 n.1 (2018).
58. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35 (EU).
59. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU).
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includes collecting, storing, and using personal data.60 Article 6(1)
provides six lawful grounds for processing.61 None of these six grounds
recognize compliance with non-European law as a lawful basis for
processing.62

***

60.
61.
62.

Id.
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU).
See id. The grounds at Article 6(1)(c)–(e) are clearly inapplicable to U.S.
financial institutions. Article 6(1)(c) permits processing necessary to comply with legal
obligations; this does not include obligations imposed by U.S. law, since Article 6(3)
limits 6(1)(c) to obligations under either European Union or Member State law. Id.
Similarly, Article 6(1)(e), which permits processing necessary to a task performed “in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller,” is inapplicable because Article 6(3)
limits 6(1)(e) to the authority created by either European Union or Member State law.
Article 6(1)(e) also permits processing necessary to a task performed “in the public
interest.” Id. That prong is also inapplicable because of Article 6(3)’s limitation and
because it only applies to public authorities or private entities established in EU Member
States, not in third countries. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 128, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
24 (EU) (explaining that when public authorities or private bodies process data “in the
public interest,” exclusive regulatory authority rests with the “supervisory authority of
the Member State where the public authority or private body is established.”). Finally,
Article 6(1)(d), which permits processing necessary to protect “vital interests” of the data
subject or a natural person, is inapplicable to U.S. financial institutions because “vital
interests” refers to interests which are “essential for the life of the data subject or . . .
another natural person.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU);
Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 46, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 8–9 (EU). Financial data is
not “essential for the life” of any person.
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Article 17 governs the right to erasure.63 It requires compliance with
procedurally valid erasure demands.64 Understanding erasure requires an
63. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Article 17
has three sections. Id. Section 1 requires controllers to fulfill erasure orders from
customers when any one of a disjunctive set of six grounds for erasure applies. Id. Section
2 governs the right to erasure when the controller has made personal data public and is
thus outside the scope of this note. Id. at 44. Section 3 provides five exceptions to
Sections 1 and 2. Id. at 44. The exceptions under Sections 17(3)(a)–(d) do not apply to
financial institutions processing customer data. 17(3)(a) and 17(3)(c), respectively,
provide exceptions for “freedom of expression and information” and “reasons of public
health.” Certainly these do not apply to financial institutions processing unpublished
customer personal financial data. See id. 17(3)(d) provides an exception for “archiving
purposes” consisted with Article 89, but as Article 89 makes clear, this applies to public
archives of historical information, so it does not apply private data retention. Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation
2016/679, art. 89, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 84–85 (EU). Section 17(3)(b) provides an exception
where processing is necessary for compliance with European Union or Member State
obligations or “for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art.
17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 44 (EU). The public interest prong is inapplicable to United States
financial institutions since it only applies to public authorities or private entities
established in EU Member States, not in third countries. See discussion supra note 60.
Notably, a litigant might argue that processing by a FINRA member firm constitutes an
exercise of official authority. However, this argument is severely flawed and, in any
event, fails to resolve the conflict. The GDPR defines “controller” to include a “legal
person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others,
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.” Given FINRA’s
dual status, a litigant could argue that FINRA’s role as a “quasi-governmental agency”
vests it with authority under the Maloney Act, while its role as a professional association
for securities firms (especially considering the related contractual nature of FINRA
membership) qualifies it as acting jointly with its members to determine the purposes and
means of processing. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (explaining FINRA). There are
three problems with this argument. First, it presupposes that the term “official authority”
as used in Section 17(3)(b) includes non-European authorities. Second, even if “official
authority” does contemplate non-European authorities, it does not necessarily include
FINRA specifically. The facts that FINRA is not a state actor and lacks judicial
enforcement power militate against such a conclusion. See Hammond, supra note 35, at
1728 (explaining that FINRA is not a state actor); see also Macey & Novogrod, supra
note 31, 965 n.42 (citing Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 572
(2d Cir. 2011) (explaining the Second Circuit’s holding that FINRA does not have
judicial enforcement power)). Third, even if a litigant prevails on this argument, the
17(3)(b) exception only resolves the conflict with respect to FINRA rules. SEC Rules
17a-3 and 17a-4 still apply to securities firms regardless of their relationship with FINRA.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2. Additionally, this theory only addresses the conflict
between the GDPR and United States securities law; banking law is entirely unaffected.
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understanding of Article 6(1)’s consent and legitimate interest grounds. If
neither apply, data processing is unlawful ab initio and subject to
mandatory erasure under Article 17(1)(d) absent a 17(3)(e) litigation
exception.65
Article 6(1)(f) permits processing if the data processor’s “legitimate
interests” are not overridden by the customer’s “interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms . . . which require protection of personal data.”66
Legitimate interests do not include U.S. legal obligations for two reasons.
First, strict limitation of Article 6(1)(c)’s “legal obligation” basis to
European Union and Member State law suggests that the GDPR
contemplates foreclosing on non-European legal obligations as
exceptions to the GDPR’s statutory scheme.67 Second, even if U.S. legal

64.
65.

Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU).
Id. Section 17(3)(e) provides an exception to Section 1’s erasure requirements
when processing is necessary “for the establishment, exercise or [defense] of legal
claims.” Id. In other words, a 17(3)(e) exception lets financial institutions prevent
spoliation of evidence and comply with litigation holds. See Margaret Rouse & Stephen
J. Bigelow,
Litigation Hold (Preservation Orders or Hold Orders), SEARCH STORAGE (July, 2007)
https://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/litigation-hold [https://perma.cc/99HZRD3C] (explaining litigation holds and spoliation); Stephanie F. Stacy, Litigation Holds:
Ten Tips in Ten Minutes, BAYLOR, EVNEN, CURTISS, GRIMIT & WITT, LLP
https://www.ned.uscourts.gov/internetDocs/cle/2010-07/LitigationHoldTopTen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P28W-ZYEP] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). So, a United States financial
institution faces no conflict regarding data relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation.
Therefore, this note focuses on resolving the conflict outside the narrow context of a
17(3)(e) exception.
66. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU).
67. See id. The fact that this limitation is stated explicitly and in a separate section
further supports this conclusion. See id. (providing the “legal obligation” basis in Section
1 and stating the limitation in Section 3). Further, Article 23(1) explicitly allows the
European Union and Member States to restrict the “scope of the obligations and rights .
. . .” provided in Articles 17 and 18 for specifically enumerated purposes. Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 23, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). Article 23(1)’s explicit
statement “Union or Member State” indicates that non-European states cannot derogate
the GDPR. See id. In addition, one of enumerated purposes refers to derogation necessary
to safeguard “a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected . . . to the
exercise of official authority.” Id. at 47. The fact that Article 23 thus validates Member
States law establishing regulatory schemes in derogation of the GDPR indicates that it
does not also validate non-European regulatory schemes, since the drafters clearly
contemplated exceptions for regulatory schemes and chose to limit such exceptions to
those under European law.
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obligations do constitute a legitimate interest, they will be overridden by
the right to erasure, which the European Union considers fundamental.68
Article 6(1)(a) permits data processing when the customer consents
thereto, subject to the conditions for consent under Article 7.69 Article
17(1)(b) requires erasure when processing relies on Article 6(1)(a)
consent, the demanding customer withdraws that consent, and “there is
68. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain, S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317 (calling the right to erasure a “fundamental right”). When
balancing legitimate interests, the GDPR’s recitals direct consideration of whether, ab
initio, the data subject “can reasonably expect” the purpose for which their data will be
processed. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 47, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 9 (EU). Since the
purpose of the U.S. data retention requirements is to preserve access to data for
unforeseen future purposes, customers of United States financial institutions cannot
reasonably expect, when the financial institution collects their personal data, the purpose
for which it will be used. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text; see also
discussion supra Part I.A.
69. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36–37 (EU); Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37 (EU). A financial institution might
include a consent clause in its standard customer agreements. Is a consent clause in an
adhesion contract a valid demonstration of consent under Articles 6(1)(a) in light of the
Article 7 conditions? Without resolving this issue, which is beyond the scope of this note,
the issue itself is relevant when examining Article 17’s erasure requirements. If resolving
this issue points to 6(1)(a) not permitting United States financial institutions to process
European customers’ personal data, and Article 6(1)(f) does not permit processing, then
Article 17(1)(d) (requiring erasure of unlawfully processed data) automatically applies
since the processing was unlawful ab initio. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016
O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). If resolving the issue points to 6(1)(a) permitting processing,
then Article 17(1)(b) requires erasure if the customer withdraws consent and “no other
legal ground for processing” applies. Id. In that case, the legitimate interest issue becomes
apposite. If, as this note concludes, Article 6(1)(f) does not extend to U.S. legal
obligations, then a 17(1)(b) demand requires erasure and thus conflicts with U.S. law.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (rejecting Article 6(1)(f)’s inclusion of United
States legal obligations as a lawful basis for processing). Regardless of whether Article
6(1)(f) does or does not initially permit processing, a customer can still demand erasure
by raising a particularized Article 21(1) objection to pursuant to Article 17(1)(c), because
an erasure demand at the interstices of Articles 17(1)(c) and 21(1) raises the standard of
lawfulness from “legitimate interest” to “compelling legitimate interest.” Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation
2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45–46 (EU). Even if the legitimate interest can
encompass United States legal obligations, based a fortiori on the same argument, supra,
against applying Article 6(1)(f)’s “legitimate interest” clause, the higher “compelling
legitimate interest” test would militate against permitting processing. See Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation
2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45–46 (EU).
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no other legal ground for the processing.”70 Article 7(3) conditions
consent on the customer being able “to withdraw his or her consent at any
time” as easily as first given.71 Thus, while consent may provide an initial
lawful basis for processing, its withdrawal vitiates that lawful basis and
puts the GDPR in conflict with U.S. law. The Article 7 conditions also
raise the issue of whether consent is actually valid in the first instance.72
Regardless, the issue is beyond this Note’s scope because consent is the
only applicable Article 6(1) lawful basis.73 Therefore, if a financial
institution falls short of Article 7’s conditions for consent, erasure can be
compelled under Article 17(1)(d); if the institution passes Article 7
muster, erasure can be required under Article 17(1)(b) when consent is
withdrawn.74
70. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Article
17(1)(b) also requires erasure when consent was given under Article 9(2)(a), which is
irrelevant to this note because 9(2)(a) lets data subjects waive the Article 9(1) prohibition
on personal data about “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, . . . genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health . . . [and a natural
person’s] sex life or sexual orientation.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 38 (EU). United States financial law does not require maintenance or preservation
of any of these categories of data. See generally supra Part I.A (discussing the
requirements imposed by United States financial law).
71. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37 (EU).
72. For example, the GDPR’s recitals state a presumption that consent is not freely
given when “the performance of a contract . . . is dependent on the consent despite such
consent not being necessary for such performance.” Council Regulation 2016/679, recital
43, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 8 (EU).
73. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU). Note that even
if, for argument’s sake, an Article 6(1)(f) “legitimate interest” provide a lawful basis, the
standard to overcome an Article 17(1)(c) erasure demand is clearly higher. See Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Under Article 17(1)(c), a
data subject can demand erasure by raising an Article 21(1) objection “on grounds
relating to his or her particular situation” when processing is based no Article 6(1)(f).
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45 (EU); see also Council
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Absent a litigation
exception identical to Article 17(3)(e), a controller must demonstrate that its “compelling
legitimate grounds for the processing . . . override the interests, rights and freedoms of
the data subject.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45 (EU)
(emphasis added). The burden of persuasion in a “compelling legitimate grounds”
balancing test rests with the controller. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 69, 2016
O.J. (L 119) 13 (EU).
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17(1)(b)); supra
note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17(1)(d)).
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2. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID) requires
financial services companies to store communications related to business
transactions for seven years.75 MiFID applies to financial institutions
“providing investment services or performing investment activities
through the establishment of a branch in the Union.”76 Though MiFID’s
recordkeeping requirements do not apply to U.S. financial institutions,
they warrant discussion for their relevance to the balancing test, which is
discussed infra.77 Specifically, MiFID’s recordkeeping requirements
suggest the European Union has recognized, in a limited context, the same
public policy as U.S. regulators.78 For example, MiFID Recital 57 states
that:
Recording of telephone conversations or electronic communications
involving client orders is compatible with the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (the Charter) and is justified in order to
strengthen investor protection, to improve market surveillance and
increase legal certainty in the interest of investment firms and their
clients.79

C. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
A state’s jurisdiction to prescribe is its “authority to make its
substantive laws applicable to particular persons and circumstances.”80
75. Shaun Hurst, Five Lessons to Learn from MiFID II, SMARSH (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.smarsh.com/blog/five-lessons-to-learn-from-mifid-ii/
[https://perma.cc/A3JR-8FXK].
76. Council Regulation 2014/65, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 41 (EC).
77. See discussion infra Parts II and III.
78. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing public policy considerations of SEC Rules 17a3 and 17a-4).
79. Council Regulation 2014/65, recital 57, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 25 (EC).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., Part IV,
Introductory Note (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Jurisdiction to prescribe is one of three classes
of jurisdiction in conflict of law analysis; the other two are jurisdiction to enforce and
jurisdiction to adjudicate. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S. § 401; see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S., PART IV (regarding jurisdiction in foreign relations law). Jurisdiction to prescribe
must exist before examining jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce. See Denis T. Rice and
Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determining Personal Jurisdiction
in Cyberspace, 58 BUS. L. 601, 603 (2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401). Jurisdiction to enforce refers to a state’s power to
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States may exercise jurisdiction outside their own territory,81 referred to
as “extra territorial jurisdiction.”82 International law approaches
extraterritorial jurisdiction in two ways.83 The prohibitive principles
approach generally grants jurisdiction unless a contrary rule prohibits it.84
The permissive principles approach only grants jurisdiction that is
specifically provided for.85 Essentially, the permissive approach tells
states when they have jurisdiction, and the prohibitive approach tells them
when they do not.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States summarizes and influences U.S. law on which jurisdiction to
prescribe.86 It adopts a permissive principles approach.87 Section 402
“employ judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce or compel compliance or punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has jurisdiction to prescribe.” Id.
at 604 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 431(1)).
This Note discusses both jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. By way of
background, jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to tribunal’s power to “resolve a dispute in
respect to a person or thing where the country has jurisdiction to prescribe the law that is
sought to be enforced.” Id. at 603 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S., CHAPTER 2, INTRODUCTORY NOTE); see also Stephanie M. Chaissan,
Note, “Minimum Contacts” Abroad: Using the International Shoe Test to Restrict the
Extraterritorial Exercise of United States Jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, 38 UNIV. OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 641, 648 (2007) (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 421) (explaining adjudicative jurisdiction in
conflict of laws analysis by comparison to International Shoe’s “minimum contacts”
standard for state courts exercise of personal jurisdiction over other states’ citizens in
U.S. law).
81. See generally R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
82. See generally id.; Watson v. Emps Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70
(1954).
83. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 2008).
84. See id. at 23–25 (quoting S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7)) (stating an argument for the prohibitive principles
approach, i.e., that “[t]he rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own
free will” and “restrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be
presumed.”).
85. Id. at 21.
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–03
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403 cmt. a
(describing the jurisdictional links in § 402 as “generally necessary.”). Customary
international law also follows the permissive principles approach. See Ryngaert, supra
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provides when states have jurisdiction to prescribe, subject to § 403’s
restraints.88 While they are not controlling authority, U.S. federal courts
often cite these sections.89 Congress can regulate extraterritorially by
clearly indicating its intent to so regulate.90 It can also choose to override
international law.91
This section outlines the Restatement’s permissive rules for
jurisdiction to prescribe. It also examines the grounds on which the United
States and European Union have prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. The
next section examines whether each state actually exercises its
jurisdiction, given that having jurisdiction is not the same as exercising
it.92

note 81, at 27 (stating “[u]nder the customary international law of jurisdiction . . .
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is arguably prohibited in the absence of a
permissive rule.”). Arguably, international law is part of United States foreign relations
law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 1(a); see also
Ryngaert, supra note 81, at 41 (citing The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(holding that “[i]nternational law is part of our law.”)).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402.
89. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165–66
(2004); Mujica v. AirScan, Inc. 771 F.3d 580, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d
1, 22 (1st Cir. 2008); BP Chems. Ltd. V. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254,
266 (3d Cir. 2000); Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp.3d 734, 757 (N.D.
Ill. 2016) (noting “courts ordinarily employ” § 403’s interest balancing test); NML
Capital, Ltd. V. Republic of Arg., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30625, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
12, 2015) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)) (noting the Second
Circuit suggestion to address the § 403 factors).
90. Equal Emp’ Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (hereinafter “EEOC”).
91. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that a
United States statute “simply modifies or supersedes customary international law” insofar
as it is inconsistent with international law); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d
189, 214 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000)) (stating “[i]t is well established that Congress has
the power to override international law” and the presumption that Congress “generally
intends its statutes to be consistent with international law” is rebuttable by “a clear
statement of intent to override international law.”).
92. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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1. Restatement Provisions
Section 402 states five bases for jurisdiction to prescribe,93 three of
which rest on “links of territoriality.”94 A state has jurisdiction over
conduct that happens “wholly or in substantial part” in its territory;
conduct abroad that “has or is intended to have substantial effect” therein;
and “the status of persons, or interests in things” therein.95 The fourth
basis rests on nationality.96 A state has jurisdiction over “the activities,
interests, status, or relations of its nationals” anywhere in the world.97
Jurisdiction must rely on one of these bases and must be reasonable under
§ 403.98 Section 403 determines reasonableness “by evaluating all
relevant factors, including” the eight listed in § 403(2).99
2. United States Jurisdiction to Prescribe
When U.S. financial institutions do business with EU customers, the
United States has jurisdiction no matter where the transactions occur.
Accordingly, the United States has jurisdiction over foreign transactions
since these have a substantial effect on U.S. financial markets.100 In
addition to the “links of territoriality” bases, the United States has
jurisdiction arising from the financial institutions’ “nationality” as U.S.
institutions.101

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402.
Id. § 402 cmt. a.
Id. § 402(1).
Id. § 402 cmt. a.
Id. § 402(2). While the Restatement also discusses the “protective” and “passive
personality” principles as jurisdictional bases, these are not relevant to the present topic.
See id. § 402 cmt. e, cmt. g; see also United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d 189, 196
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000) (discussing the protective and passive personality principles).
After passing the first step of the Section 402 inquiry, reasonableness is determined under
Section 403 “by evaluating all relevant factors, including” the eight listed in Section
403(2). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 403(1)–(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also discussion infra Part II.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403.
99. Id. § 403(2); see also discussion infra Part II.
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(1)).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2)
(providing that a state has jurisdiction over “the activities . . . or relations of its
nationals.”).
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If applying U.S. data preservation rules when U.S. financial
institutions do business with European customers would constitute an
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, then the issue of whether the
United States actually exercises such jurisdiction depends on the
Morrison-Kiobel analysis, discussed infra.102
3. European Union Jurisdiction to Prescribe
The Restatement is not binding in European courts. European law
provides the jurisdictional rules in Europe. When EU conflict of law rules
apply EU substantive law, analysis of jurisdiction to prescribe would be
immaterial in European court proceedings.103 Therefore, this section
focuses on the application of U.S. jurisdictional rules in U.S. courts.
European Union Member State courts will follow their own choice
of law rules. If a Member State’s rules point to applying U.S. law, then
there is no conflict. More likely, though, member state courts would apply
GDPR. Part III.C addresses this situation.
When litigated in U.S. courts, a court would first test whether the
European Union has jurisdiction to prescribe—as that concept is
understood in U.S. foreign relations law.104 A U.S. court would likely find
that the European Union has jurisdiction to prescribe laws respecting its
Member States’ citizens interactions with U.S. financial institutions,
either based on nationality jurisdiction, or on status-based territorial
jurisdiction. The European Union could exercise nationality jurisdiction
because transactions with its Member States’ citizens involve “the
activities, interests . . . or relations of its nationals” regardless of where
the transactions happen.105 It could exercise status-based territorial
jurisdiction because a European’s transactions with a U.S. financial
institution affect the “status of persons, or interests in things” within the
European Union.106 To wit, the transaction would affect the status of the
European customers (persons) and their financial assets (things). The
European Union likely cannot exercise objective territorial jurisdiction
because doing so requires finding that the transactions were intended to

102.
103.
104.
105.

See discussion infra Part I.D.1.
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
106. Id. § 402(1)(b).
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have an effect on European persons and markets.107 Proving a financial
institution had such intent would be very difficult.
D. ACTUAL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
Jurisdiction allows a state to regulate but does not require it to do
so. The analysis does not end merely because the United States and the
European Union both have jurisdiction under sections 402 and 403. A
conflict only exists if both actually exercise their jurisdiction. This section
discusses United States exercise of jurisdiction under the MorrisonKiobel framework109 and European Union exercise of jurisdiction under
GDPR Article 3.
108

1. United States
United States courts determine a law’s extraterritorial reach using the
Morrison-Kiobel two-step analysis,110 which relies on a canon of statutory
construction called the presumption against extraterritoriality.111 Under
the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts presume that
Congressional statutes and the regulations thereunder do not apply
outside the United States unless “the statute demonstrates Congress’
‘affirmative inten[t]’ that the law should apply” extraterritorially.112
Step One asks whether Congress clearly and affirmatively rebutted
the presumption.113 If a court concludes that it did, the statute applies
outside the United States, subject to any limits Congress explicated.114 A
“yes” at Step One signals that Congress exercised its jurisdiction to
prescribe.

107.
108.
109.

See id. § 402(1)(c).
See discussion supra Part I.C (defining jurisdiction to prescribe).
R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093–94 (2016) (citing
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
112. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC, 499 U.S. 248).
113. Id. at 2101.
114. Id.
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A regulation’s extraterritorial reach derives from that of its
authorizing statute.115 If the statute fails Step One, so does the
regulation.116 So, whether Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 apply extraterritorially
depends on whether Exchange Act § 17 applies extraterritorially.
Morrison held that §§ 10(b) and 30(b) did not apply extraterritorially.117
Though each section of the Exchange Act must be analyzed separately,
federal courts have not found § 17 to apply extraterritorially since
Morrison was decided.118
If the answer is no at Step One, the court can still find that Congress
exercised jurisdiction under Morrison-Kiobel or Step Two.119 This step
asks whether the case involves a “domestic application” of the law.120 If
it does, the statute and its regulations govern the conduct at issue.121
Courts answer this question by identifying the conduct that is relevant to
the statute’s focus.122 If the conduct “occurred in the United States, then
the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct
occurred abroad.”123 The issue then is whether the conduct relevant to the
Exchange Act’s focus occurred in the United States.124 This is “essentially
an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid
triggering the presumption at all.”125

115. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261–62 (2010) (citing
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)) (holding that the regulation at issue
in Morrison, Rule 10b-5, “does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s
prohibition.”).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 261–65 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b)) (holding that Exchange Act § 30(b)
does not apply extraterritorially).
118. See id.; see also R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2108
(2016) (applying the presumption separately to the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act’s substantive prohibitions and its private right of action).
119. See Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 216 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–70 (2010); Mastafa v. Chevron
Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2014); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266,
272–73 (2d Cir. 2014); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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Legislative history indicates that the focus of Exchange Act § 17 is
on preserving data so regulators can enforce securities laws.126 This
policy, viewed in light of the Exchange Act’s comprehensive regulatory
framework for U.S. securities markets, indicates that data preservation is
domestic in nature. Section 17’s relevant conduct is clearly data
preservation.127 What constitutes preservation can be interpreted in two
ways. If the relevant conduct is the act of storing data, then storing it on
systems and networks in the United States is domestic in nature. If the
relevant conduct is instead interpreted as refraining from deletion, then
the internal decision by a U.S. business to refrain is domestic in nature.
For this same reason, the data preservation requirements in banking law
are also domestic in nature. Under the Morrison-Kiobel analysis, U.S.
financial law applies to the situations this Note addresses.128
2. European Union
GDPR Article 3 applies the regulation’s substantive provisions in
two ways—on an “establishment” basis and on a global basis.129 Article
3(1)—establishment application—applies the GDPR “to the processing
of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a
controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the
processing takes place in the Union or not.”130 Article 3(2)—global
application—applies the GDPR “to the processing of personal data of data
subjects who are in the Union” by institutions outside the European Union
who either enter its stream of commerce or monitor the behavior of
European customers.131 The latter form, based on a stream of commerce
application, applies worldwide.132

126. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’ and the
SEC’s positions that the mandatory data preservation scheme promotes regulatory
certainty and market integrity).
127. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 48 Stat. 881
(1934).
128. See R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093–94 (2016)
(citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroluem Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
129. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 3, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32–33 (EU).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See Una Dean & Melis S. Kiziltay Carter, New Guidelines on GDPR’s
Territorial Scope Confirm It Reaches Far Beyond the EU, N.Y. L. J. (Mar. 4, 2019),
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E. IDENTIFYING THE CONFLICT
The European Union and the United States both potentially exercise
their respective jurisdictions to prescribe, with conflicting prescriptions.
This calls for a resolution. Part II examines the doctrinal framework for
that resolution: the interest balancing test under U.S. foreign relations law
and customary international law. Part III examines and balances each
state’s interests to determine which state has a stronger interest in
regulating financial institutions’ data processing. It also addresses the
enforceability of foreign judgments ordering U.S. financial institutions to
erase data under the GDPR.
II. CONFLICT
A. LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
United States conflict of law rules rely on a three-step analysis of
jurisdiction to prescribe.133 The first step examines whether the state has
a legal basis for jurisdiction under the permissive rules of section 402 of
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States.134
Second, exercising jurisdiction must be reasonable under Section
403(2).135 Third, if two states with conflicting prescriptions can
reasonably exercise jurisdiction, an interest balancing test is used to
determine which state’s law should control.136
1. Rule of Reasonableness
Section 403(2) is a non-exhaustive list of eight factors for
determining the reasonableness of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction to
prescribe under Section 402.137 Federal courts frequently rely on
Restatement Sections 402 and 403.138 The Section 403 factors are:

https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ_Dean_Kiziltay%20Carter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KRZ-4783].
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–03
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
134. Id. § 402.
135. Id. § 403(2).
136. Id. § 403(3).
137. Id. §§ 403(2), 403 cmt. b.
138. See supra note 87.
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the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between the state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.139

As explained in Part III, each state has at least some reasonable basis
for exercising jurisdiction. Resolving the issue centers around the interest
balancing test, which is discussed below.
2. Interest Balancing Test
Under Section 403, when two states can reasonably exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe, courts must conduct an interest balancing test
using the reasonableness factors of Section 403(2).140 The state with the
139.
140.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2).
Id. In United States foreign relations law, comity considerations are independent
of Morrison-Kiobel analysis. Comity in United States courts dates back to the Supreme
Courts’ decision in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, where the court adopted
the canon that an act of Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). This was the first time this canon appeared in a Supreme
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weaker interest should defer to the state with the stronger interest.141 This
responsibility belongs to whichever court, in the United States, hears the
dispute. It is not a negotiation between the two states whose laws conflict.
The Restatement’s interest balancing test does not apply in European
courts.
B. LITIGATION IN EUROPEAN COURTS
GDPR provides two enforcement mechanisms. Article 79 provides
for judicial enforcement by granting data subjects a private right of
action.142 Proceedings by EU customers against financial institutions must
be brought in Member State courts.143 Articles 57 and 58 provides for
administrative enforcement by Member States’ supervisory authorities144
and requires supervisory authorities to “monitor and enforce [the
GDPR’s] application” in their territories.145 Article 58 provides, in
relevant part:
Each supervisory authority shall have . . . corrective powers:
to order the controller or the processor to comply with the data
subject’s requests to exercise his or her rights pursuant to this
Regulation;
to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into
compliance with the provisions of this Regulation . . .;
to order the . . . erasure of personal data . . . pursuant to Article[] 17 .
. .;
to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83 . . .

Court decision, but the canon was far from novel—it dates back to twelfth-century Italy.
See Ryngaert, supra note 81, 46–47. Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 164 (1895). The interest balancing test is a form of comity analysis.
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(3).
142. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 79, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 80 (EU).
143. Id.
144. Council Regulation 2016/679, arts. 57–58, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 68–70 (EU).
145. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 57, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 68 (EU).
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The exercise of the powers conferred on the supervisory authority
pursuant to this Article shall be subject to appropriate safeguards,
including effective judicial remedy and due process, set out in Union
and Member State law in accordance with the Charter.146

If a Member State court issues a judgment against a U.S. financial
institution—either to affirm an administratively imposed penalty under
Article 58, or to adjudicate an Article 57 private action—U.S. law will
determine the judgments’ enforceability in the United States.147 In an
analogous case, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a French judgment
against a U.S. technology service provider.148 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
declined to reach the First Amendment issue, instead ruling the case was
not ripe for decision.149 However, in dicta, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Restatement’s rule that “an American court will not enforce a judgment
if the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment
itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States.”150 Mere
inconsistency between the foreign judgment and U.S. law is insufficient
to constitute repugnancy.151
Part III.C advocates for applying the repugnancy approach to EU
Member State judgments against U.S. financial institutions for violating
GDPR’s erasure requirements.152
Two standards of repugnancy are relevant for purposes of this Note.
Under the first, “[e]xtreme, intolerable differences” give rise to a “public
policy exception,” whereby national courts may refuse to enforce foreign
judgments “on the grounds of inconsistency with national public

146.
147.

Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 58, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.3d 909, 937 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“But no nation can expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to
prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Every nation must often rely on other countries to help
it achieve its regulatory expectations.”).
148. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo!
France), 433 F.3d 1199, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006).
149. Id. at 1221.
150. Id. at 1213–14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE U.S. § 482(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
151. See id. at 1214.
152. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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policy.”153 This comports with the rule that mere inconsistency of law
does not constitute repugnancy, since this standard requires (a) that such
differences be both extreme and intolerable, and (b) that the inconsistency
be not just of laws but also of national public policies. Second, a “common
formulation” of repugnancy weighs public policy concerns against
comity. Comity generally directs national courts to enforce foreign
judgments, except “where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
sought.”154 This Note refers to these three standards, respectively, as the
“extreme, intolerable differences” standard and the “fundamental
notions” standard.
III. RESOLUTION
A. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. SECURITIES LAW
WHEN LITIGATED IN U.S. COURTS
1. Identifying and Analyzing Each States’ Interests
Ultimately, courts should balance the United States’ and European
Union’s interests. First, then, this analysis must identify those interests
with respect to securities law.
a. Link of Activity to Regulating State’s Territory
Section 403(2)(a) directs consideration of “the link of the activity to
the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity
takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory.”155
Regarding the extent to which the activity occurs in the regulating
state’s territory, as discussed in Part I, data processing occurs in the
United States.156 While the underlying financial transaction can be
153. Alex Mills, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 16 n.46, 257 (Cambridge Univ. Press, ed., 2009).
154. Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 177 (2004)
(citing Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986)).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2).
156. See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the Morrison-Kiobel Step Two
analysis).
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considered as occurring partially in both states, the regulated conduct is
not the transaction, but the treatment data arising therefrom. The United
States has a stronger territorial link to the conduct taking place within its
borders, since data processing is performed by securities firms in the
United States.
Next is the issue of effect. Weighing where there would be a
foreseeable effect is ultimately unhelpful, since the effect on market
integrity in the United States and the effect on data privacy in the
European Union would both be foreseeable. This leaves the inquiry to
focus on which effect is more substantial or direct. The effect on the
United States would be more substantial, because market integrity affects
every participant in U.S. capital markets. By contrast, data retention
would only affect the privacy interests of the narrow class of European
customers who demand erasure. That said, for the same reason, the effect
on those European customers would be more direct than the abstract effect
on market integrity.
As to the effects, foreseeability is unhelpful, as the “substantial”
prong weighs towards U.S. law, and the “direct” prong weighs toward EU
law. So, the effects consideration is a wash overall. Therefore,
considering the 403(2)(a) factors, the “extent” prong weighs towards U.S.
securities law, so the 403(2)(a) analysis overall points toward the United
States having a stronger interest.
b. Connections Between Regulating States and Principally Responsible
Party
Section 403(2)(b) directs consideration of “the connections, such as
nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between the state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect.”157
Here, it is beyond cavil that the party principally responsible for the
activity is the U.S. securities firm. Surely the United States has stronger
connections with its securities firms than the European Union does.
Therefore, this factor also points towards the United States having a
stronger interest in regulating the relevant conduct.

157.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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c. Character and Importance of Regulated Activity and the Extent to
Which Other States Regulate It
Section 403(2)(c) directs consideration of “the character of the
activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted.”158 For U.S. securities regulators, mandatory data retention is
very important, since allowing data erasure would undermine regulators’
ability to monitor securities firms to ensure market integrity and investor
protection.
While the European Union certainly considers data privacy rights
important, the interaction of MiFID and the legal obligation exception to
erasure requirements indicates that the European Union does not view
data privacy rights with as high a level of importance as the United States
views data preservation laws, which provide no exceptions. Therefore,
this factor also points toward the United States having a stronger interest
in regulating the relevant conduct.
On the extent to which other states regulate the relevant conduct, the
tradition of MiFID again matters. MiFID shows that, internationally, it is
not uncommon for states to require financial institutions to retain at least
some data.159 It reflects a shared policy interest of both the United States
and the European Union.160 On the other hand, the European Union is
unique in mandating erasure on demand.161 Thus, this factor should weigh
even more strongly towards the United States having a stronger interest
in regulating the relevant conduct.
d. Justified Expectations
Section 403(2)(d) directs consideration of “the existence of justified
expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation.”162
Applying GDPR would hurt the justified expectation the US has. The

158.
159.
160.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
Hurst, supra note 77.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing public policy considerations of SEC
Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4).
161. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33–34 (EU).
162. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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United States expects data to be stored, sometimes in WORM format.163
The requirement’s purpose is to make data available to regulators for
audits, Rule 8210 requests, and other data demands.164 Regulators’
expectations that securities firms will comply by providing “legible, true
and complete” copies of required records would be “undermined to the
extent that these records are inaccurate . . . or capable of alteration.”165
Applying U.S. securities law would thus protect this expectation.
Conversely, applying GDPR’s erasure requirement would hurt this
expectation.
This factor should weigh the United States’ interest in market
integrity and regulatory competence more heavily than the European
Union’s interest in data protection. The former is a market-wide interest
protecting the broad class of participants in U.S. capital markets,
including both Americans and Europeans.
Other EU laws even recognize such an expectation as justified.166
MiFID Recital 57 calls that directive’s limited mandatory data
preservation rule is “justified to strengthen investor protection, to improve
market surveillance and increase legal certainty in the interest of
investment firms and their clients.”167
Even assuming a European customer has an expectation that the
financial institution will honor his or her erasure demands, such
expectation must not be “justified.”168 European customers can choose
whether to enter U.S. capital markets; other participants cannot choose to
exclude them. Adjudging the 403(2)(d) interest in favor of GDPR would
forcibly deprive market participants of the U.S. regulatory system’s
expected benefits.169 Adjudging in favor of U.S. securities law would not
163. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining regulators’
expectation that securities firms will “promptly furnish legible, true and complete copies
of” required records).
164. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining regulators’
expectation that securities firms will “promptly furnish legible, true and complete copies
of” required records); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining FINRA
Rule 8210).
165. SEC Interpretation: Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, Exchange Act
Release 34-44238 (May 1, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-44238.htm.
[https://perma.cc/F29F-VGGK].
166. Council Regulation 2014/65, recital 57, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 25 (EC).
167. Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.B.2.
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
169. See id.
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deprive European customers of their expectation, since they can simply
choose not to participate in the United States’ capital markets. A
European customer entering a foreign capital market should not deprive
that market’s regulators of its ability to enforce the regulatory scheme
implemented by a democratically-elected Congress. Nor should they
deprive other market participants of the market integrity benefit the
regulatory scheme was designed to provide.
This remains true even when U.S. financial institutions market their
services to European customers. Those customers can still choose
whether to transact with U.S. financial institutions, which are governed
by U.S. law.
The United States’ interest in market integrity weighs in favor of
applying U.S. law and weighs more heavily than the European interest in
individual persons’ erasure demands. Europeans concerned about their
data privacy and erasure rights can simply avoid doing business with the
United States. However, as long as the U.S. financial markets remain open
to international business, other market participants cannot avoid the loss
of market integrity that would result from giving special treatment to EU
residents.
e. Importance to and Traditions of the International System
Section 403(e) and (f) direct consideration of a regulation’s
“importance . . . to the international political, legal, or economic system”
and the “extent to which [it] is consistent with the traditions of” those
systems.170
Even though MiFID may not necessarily apply, its existence creates
a tradition that securities firms are different than other businesses and can
reasonably be required to retain some data regardless of what the
customer wants. That tradition should weaken the European Union’s
interest, since U.S. regulations are consistent with the tradition embodied
by MiFID. The fact that the GDPR was enacted against the backdrop of
MiFID, and provides a legal obligation exception, suggests that GDPR’s
enactment does not vitiate the tradition embodied by MiFID that
mandatory data retention rules for financial institutions are not per se
unreasonable.

170.

Id.
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2. Balancing the Interests
For these reasons, a court should conclude from the interest
balancing test that the United States has a stronger interest than the
European Union does in regulating securities transactions between U.S.
securities firms and EU customers. Under Section 403(3) then, the GDPR
must yield to U.S. securities law.
B. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. BANKING LAW
WHEN LITIGATED IN U.S. COURTS
1. Identifying and Analyzing Each States’ Interests
Next, this analysis identifies the United States’ and European
Union’s interests with respect to banking law.
a. Restatement Factors 403(2)(a), (b), and (d)-(f)
The same considerations relevant to securities law are also relevant
to banking law with respect to Restatement factors 403(2)(a), (b), (d), (e),
and (f).171 As with securities law, these factors weight more strongly
toward the United States’ interest in having its banking law apply as well.
So, this section limits discussion to factor (c).
b. Character and Importance of Regulated Activity and the Extent to
Which Other States Regulate It
Section 403(2)(c) directs consideration of “the character of the
activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted.”172 The character of data retention in banking law is even more
important, given the anti-money laundering rules imposed by the Bank
Secrecy Act. Given the ability of money launderers to move money to
“high risk” countries, U.S. regulators have a very strong interest in having
access to bank data to prevent laundered money from reaching “high risk”

171.
172.

See discussion supra Part III.A.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2).
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countries, including countries with a high risk of terrorist financing
activity.173
2. Balancing the Interests
For these reasons, a court should conclude from the interest
balancing test that the United States has a stronger interest than the
European Union does in regulating banking transactions between U.S.
banks and EU customers. Under Section 403(3) then, the GDPR must
yield to U.S. banking law.
C. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO EUROPEAN COURT
JUDGMENTS AGAINST U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In Yahoo! France, the Ninth Circuit argued in dicta that U.S. courts
could refuse to enforce foreign judgments where the judgment was based
on a cause of action repugnant to U.S. public policy.174 U.S. federal courts,
and many state courts, apply the repugnancy standard; they should
continue to do so because EU law should not be have the effect of
disabling U.S. financial regulators and harming those they protect.175 This
Note argues that any U.S. court should refuse to enforce foreign erasure
orders that conflict with U.S. financial law’s mandatory data preservation
requirements. They should so refuse because, as explained supra during
the interest balancing tests, the erasure requirement is strongly contrary
to U.S. public policy.
Congress has recognized that mandatory data preservation is central
to U.S. public policy.176 Preservation is central for three reasons. First, the
financial regulatory regime recognizes that regulators have limited
resources.177 The SEC, for example, relies not just on FINRA, but also on
securities firms to enforce securities laws.178 Policing transactions ex ante
would be impractical as well. To regulate firms’ behavior ex post,
173. See Alicia Cortez, HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES IN AML MONITORING, ACAMS,
http://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/High-Risk-Countries-in-AMLMonitoring-Alicia-Cortez.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVX3-6JW9].
174. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2006).
175. See discussion supra Part II.B.
176. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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regulators need access to data about that behavior. So, regulators would
have to maintain data themselves if firms were not required to. This would
divert regulators’ limited resources away from other regulatory
operations. However, it would be regulators’ only option since their
expectations of firms’ compliance would be undermined insofar as such
records can be edited or deleted.179
Second, mandatory data preservation rules prevent regulated firms
from shirking their responsibility for internally assuring compliance with
financial law.180 In the absence of such rules, profit motives could
incentivize financial institutions to cut their expenses on compliance
programs by not maintaining data. Since regulators rely on financial
institutions to maintain data, these rules serve an important public policy
of assuring regulators the data will be available without the risk that
regulated entities delete it to save money.
Third, mandatory data preservation protects regulators from
obstruction.181 Without such rules, firms could hide regulatory violations
from regulators by deleting inculpatory data. Data preservation rules
counteract this incentive: deleting evidence of a violation is itself a
violation.
Applying the “[e]xtreme, intolerable differences” standard, courts
should refuse enforcement of European judgments requiring deletion
because they are inconsistent with the U.S. public policy favoring data
preservation. Given the importance of mandatory data retention rules just
discussed, deviating from these rules would be extreme. Since financial
regulators cannot properly regulate financial institutions without
mandatory data retention rules, such deviation would also invalidate the
public policy choices underlying U.S. financial regulation.
Applying the “fundamental notions” standard, courts should also
refuse enforcement. Regulatory failure would likely result in regulatory
violations going undetected. Because allowing exceptions to the data
retention rules would compromise regulators’ ability to regulate, such
exceptions would likely result in regulatory violations going undetected.
Regulation provides a blanket of protection against indecent and unjust

179.
180.

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance to Broker-Dealers on the Use of
Electronic Storage Media, 66 Fed. Reg. 22916, 22921 (May 1, 2001) (citing 146 CONG.
REC. S5230 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hollings, Wyden, and
Sarbanes)).
181. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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conduct. Cutting a hole in that blanket would thus be repugnant to U.S.
public policy under the “fundamental notions” standard.
Under both standards, European judgments compelling data deletion
are repugnant to U.S. public policy. Whichever standard courts adopt,
they should thus refuse to enforce such European judgments. Data
deletion orders are not merely inconsistent with U.S. law; they are
exceedingly inconsistent with a central element of U.S. public policy
judgments about how to regulate the securities and banking industries.
CONCLUSION
Resolving the conflict between U.S. financial law and GDPR thus
requires two different approaches depending on the court in which the
litigation commences. When litigation begins in U.S. courts, U.S.
securities and banking law should prevail over GDPR since the interest
balancing tests weigh in favor of U.S. law. However, when litigation
begins in Europe, U.S. courts should refuse enforcement because the
erasure requirement is repugnant to U.S. public policy.

